URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN－AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS－ by Yamada, Hiroyuki
Title












URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM 
IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 
- AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS -
By Hiroyuki YAMADA * 
I DeveloplDent of Urban Transportation ProblelD 
The urbanization and motorization which have been making striking develop-
ments in the period of rapid economic growth in this country since World War II, 
particularly after 1955, have exerted a tremendous influence both on the Japanese 
economy and the whole of Japanese society, and they are having a particularly 
decisive influence on urban transportation; so it has recently become a major 
concern of Japanese life and public policy. 
The single dominating mean of transport in Japan used to be the railway, from 
the prewar period until quite recently. It is ture that the railway facilities were 
devastated by the war and that the traffic difficulties caused by the absolute lack of 
railway facilities immediately after the war were steadily overcome by transport 
investment chiefly in rolling stocks, but as far as urban transportation is concerned, 
a new type of traffic problem has arisen. Particularly since the beginning of rapid 
economic growth in this country, the demand for transportation has increasingly 
begun to exceed progress in reinforcing transportation capacity and the absolute 
lack 0f fixed transportation facilities has brought about serious problems related to 
urban traffic difficulties in an ever-aggravating phase of late. This presents an 
extremely complex phase, such as overcrowded phenomena like passengers jammed 
in commuter trains, road accidents with motor vehicles and frequent traffic 
congestion on the one hand, and stagnant phenomena like the decline of demand 
for streetcar and bus and the financial crisis in public transportation enterprises 
on the other. 
Needless to say, the causes of these circumstances must be sought, fundamental-
ly speaking, in the peculiar characteristics of Japan's economic development itself 
during the postwar period. The Japanese economy has been developing in a pat-
tern mainly composed of the activities of private production through investment for 
industrial equipment since the end of the war and as a result Japanese economy 
has been left behind in the relative accumulation of so-called social overhead 
capital in spite of the fact that the absolute level of public investment has not 
always been low. At the same time, the lack of government policy with respect to 
regional development and urban transportation must also be pointed out in this 
connection. 
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The present study intends to analyse the existing conditions of urban transpor-
tation problems and to suggest what urban transportation policy should be. 
Therefore, it is necessary to clarify recent trends in the concentration of population 
in urban areas, to start with. 
II Recent Trends in Urbanization 
Let us first see how the cityward movement of population is taking place. Its 
characteristic features may be summarised as follows: first of all one of the most 
outstanding features is the rapid population movement from rural communities 
to urban communities. In Table I the rates of population increase for rural 
and urban areas are compared, which show that the urban population increased 
10% in the five year period 1960-65, in contrast to the rural population which 
decreased a little more than 5% I'. 
Table I. Increase in Population for Urban and Rural Areas (Unit: %) 
1955-60 
1960-65 
Urban District Rural District Total Population 
9.4 -2.7 4.6 
I 
_9.: _________ -_5_.4 _________ 5._2 ____ J 
Source: Economic Planning Agency, Present Conditions in National Life and Living (in Japanese), 
1965, p. 67. 
The next notable point is the fact that the larger the size of cities happens to be, 
the more rapid movement of the concentration of population is found to be and the 
trend is especially conspicuous in the case of Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya. The 
reason is because this concentration, giving rise to the "benefits of agglomeration" 
as concentration makes headway and in turn by stimulating further concentration, 
is creating a phenomenon called "concentration drawing concentration". Never-
theless, at the same time this trend of concentration has brought about the serious 
illeffects of excessive density, such as traffic difficulties, public nuisances, etc., and 
as a result the lack of social overhead capital has come to be keenly felt recently". 
Partly owing to this circumstance the degree of concentration in the three cities just 
mentioned of economic indices other than population showed some decrease after 
1960 as shown in Table 2". 
At the same time some change has also taken place in the composition of 
urbanized population since 1960, which means that the population in mammoth 
1) Economic Planning Agency~ Present Conditions in National Life and Living (.inJapanese)~ 1965, 
pp.67-68. 
2) It is since social overhead capital was taken up for the first time in The Annual Report on Japanese 
EconomyJor 1960 (in Japanese) that social overhead capital has become the topic for discussion 
in this country. 
3) It becomes possible to expect from TabJe 2 Lliat changes were entailed in the cityward movement 
of population lagging in time to somc cxtent behind other economic indices. 
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Table 2. Degree of Concentration in Metropolitan Areas (Proportions for Tokyo, 
Oska and Aichi (Nagoya) Prefecture in National Total) 
---I --
1 1 
1955 1960 1964 
Population 18.4% 20.8% *22.7% 
Employees in Manufacturing Industry 33.7% 36.2% 34.1 % 
Value of Shipments from Establishments 31.4% 38.2% 35.4% 
Sourc~: Investigation Bureau of Economic Planning Agency, Handbook of Communii)' Economy (in 
Japanese),1966. • Figures for 1965_ 
cities like Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya made such a conspicuous increase in the 
outskirts that this tendency came to be distinctly noted as a new movement called 
"urban sprawl". As shown in Figure I the population of Tokyo increased by the 
greatest number in an area within approximately 5 kilometers of the city center for 
the period 1950-55, within 10-20 kilometers for the period 1955-60, within 20-40 
kilometers (the greatest increase being 25 kilometers) for the period 1960-65, and 
moreover this sprawl has been taking place in an extremely disorderly manner. 
Figure 1. Changes in the Growth Rate of Population 
in the Outskirts of Tokyo 
~ 
"'-~ 1.5 ~ -- 1960-65 
~ 
.. 
~ -- 1955-60 
w 
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Source: White Paper afthe Ministry of Construction (in Japanese), 1966. 
Concurrently with this sprawling tendency the population in the central area 
of the city during nighttime began to decrease and as a result what may be called 
doughnut-phenomena began to be noticeable after 1960, which can be seen in Table 
3. In this connection we can conclude that the population in the central city is 
fluctuating between stagnation and decrease and that the rate of population increase 
in the city proper is growing less, gradually reaching its saturation point. Forming 
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(23 wards) Tokyo Metropolis 
Tokyo Commuting 
Area 
1950 1,187.7 5,385.1 6,239.6 10,479.3 
55 1,444.4 (121.6%) 6,969.1 (129.4%) 7,996.5 (128.2%) 12,896.5 (123.1%) 






City pro~e~--l~o:a~~ p~~fec~:i~I~:~~-~~~uti;' 
1950 202.1 
55 271.2 ( 134.2%) 
2,015.4 I 3,795.7 7,031.3 
2,547.3 (126.4%) 4,549.0 (119.8%) 8,202.6 (116.6%) 
60 291.2 (107.4%) 
56 253.3 ( 87.1%) 
3,011.6 (118.2%) 5,504.7 (121.0%) I 9,567.1 (116.6%) 
3,156.2 (104.8%) 6,657.1 (120.9%) 11,290.7 (1l8.0%) 
-- ----------~--. ----- --------- -----_.- -_ ...• __ . - - - -------- ---- --------------, 
Source: Ministry or Transport, Annual Report of Urhan Transportation (in Japanese), J 964. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are ratios to the previous period. 
a striking contrast with this tendency, the population in commuting areas within a 
radius of 50 kilometers from the city center increased at a strikingly rapid rate. 
Moreover, it has come to our notice that this commuting radius is growing; it extends 
further than 50 kilometers these days. This expansion of the cities and the sparse 
population in the central city are the third characteristic features of the present 
urbanization. 
The fourth characteristic ascribable as a result is the fact that the difference in 
the population during daytime and nighttime is growing ever larger and larger and 
that the number of commuters who flow into the central business district (CBD) 
Table 4. Daytime and Nighttime Population (Osaka) 
- - ------- ---- -- - -- -- --- --
I 1955 1960 _. __ L __ 1965 
-------------- ---- .- -.--
Nighttime Population (A) 2,547.3 (100.0) 3,011.6 (1l8.2) 3,156.2 (123.9) 
Inflowing Population 373.4 (100.0) 578.1 (154.8) 882.3 (236.3) 
Outftowing Population 62.6 (100.0) 102.1 (162.9) 176.2 (281.5) 
Daytime Population (B) 2,858.1 ( 100.0) 3,487.6 (122.0) 3,862.3 (135.1) 
B/A 1.12 1.16 2.22 
----- --_.,_. 
Source: Planning Bureal1 of Osaka City~ Statistical Reiums oj D{~Ylime Po/mIa/ion oj Osaka City, 1965, 
(in Japanese) 1966. 
Note: Daytime population-=Nighttimc population + Inflowing population - Ouflowing population. 
I , 
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to work is increasing at a strikingly rapid rate. Taking Osaka for an example, as 
shown in Table 4, the total of the inflowing population in 1965 reached as much 
as approximately 2.4 times that in 1955, naturally giving rise to increased demand 
for transportation facilities to transport such a vast flow of people. Especially as 
this commuting population is obliged to make trips at certain hours of the day, it 
is making the problem more and more aggravated. 
III Changes in Demand for Urban Transportation 
What effects do the trends in urbanization as described above have on the 
transport demands of passengers in densely populated cities? 
First of all let us see the relationship between the population of a mammoth city 
and the number of transit passengers. In Table 5 is shown the relationship 
between the population living within the commuting areas of Tokyo, Osaka and 
Nagoya and the number of rail transit passengers. In contrast to the comparative 
ratio of the population of these three areas, which stands at 3: 2: I, the number 
of passengers carried by railway transit correspondingly indicate a fairly close rate 
to 9: 4: I. I t is quite safe, therefore, to say that the number of passengers increase 
in proportion to square of the population. This rule is found to be particularly 
true in the case of the total number of passengers for the rail rapid transits. This 
fact is highly suggestive of the justifiability of the gravity-model. 




--- --,--- - -------------- ------~---- ~ -~--.--
Rail Rapid Transits') 
uting Corom 
Ar ea Population 
Rail Transit Commuter (Total) Ticket 










5,493 (7.84) 3,091 (11.2) 
2,951 (4.20) 1,424 (5.29) 





1,638 (9.20) 4,658 (10.4) 
712 (3.97) 2,136 (4.76) 
179 (1.00) 449 (1.00) 
Source: Ministry of Transport, Annual Report of Urban Transportation (in Japanese), 1964. 
Note: 1. Rail transits include national railways, private railways and public streetcars. 
2. Rail rapid transits include national railways and private railways. 
3. Figures in parentheses arc values on the assumption of 1.00 for the Nagoya commuting area. 
These results obtained from the cross-section data can of course be confirmed 
on the basis of time series data. In other words, as shown in Table 6, the number 
of people carried is found to expand approximately in proportion to square of the 
population. In addition, when the elasticity of the number of passengers with respect 
to population is calculated by comparing two different years, the findings for 1955~ 
60 stand at 2.0-2.4, the same figures for 1955~60 stand at 3.15-3.5, showing a sharp 
contrast in increase. In this connection it is very noticeable that the difference 
! 
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Table 6. Changes in Urban Population and Number of Passengers (Unit: I million) 
Commuting Area I Year I Population I Passengers I Elasticity 
1955 12.896 (1.00) 5,142.2 ( 1.00) 
Tokyo 1960 15.370 (1.19) 7,501.1 (1.46) 2.42 
1965 18.483 (1.43) 10,221.7 (2.38) 3.15 
I i 
1955 8.203 (1.00) 2,934.1 ( 1.00) 
Osaka (includes Kyoto, 1960 9.567 (1.1 7) 3,992.0 ( 1.30) 2.00 Kobe) 
1965 11.291 (1.38) 6,405.9 (2.18) 3.50 
Source: The same as in Table 5. 
Note: 1. The number of passengers represents the total of the number of passengers carried in 
commuting areas. 
2. Elasticity means percentage change of passengers divided by percentage change ofpopu~ 
lation. 
3. Figures in parentheses represent values on the basis of 1.00 for the year 1955. 
according to years is far greater than that according to areas, and it is also very 
interesting to find that the relationships in which the number of passengers changes 
in proportion to square of the population indicate far stabler results. Hence, it 
follows that the transportation demand of any large city can be studied in the light 
of the above-mentioned relationships existing between urban population and the 
n umber of passengers. 
Next, we need to see how urban transportation demand is distributed among 
different transportation facilities. It is observed from Table 7 that the total num-
ber of passengers in the Tokyo commuting area increased to approximately twice 
its previous level in the period 1955-65, but the pattern in use for urban transpor-
tation facilities has been rapidly changing. First of all, subways made the greatest 
increase, which was an increase of 4.4 times. Buses and taxis come next in the 
ranking order, indicating a conspicuous increase of approximately 2.7 times. In 
contrast to these figures, the use of the streetcar came to be in a state of stagnation 
after the period 1955-60 and it began to show a definite tendency to decline during 
the period 1960-65. The number of people carried by subway, streetcar and bus 
was 34-35%, without showing much fluctuation, the fact of which shows that 
transportation demand within the city has shifted from the use of the streetcar to 
that of taxi, bus and subway. 
As to the transport facilities between suburban areas and the central city, in 
contrast to the stabilizing share on the part of private railways, it is noteworthy that 
the share on the part of the national railways shows a gradual decline, the fact of 
which means that the transportation capacity of the national railways, which have 
the largest share in the Tokyo commuting area, has reached the saturation point. 
The total number of passengers in the Osaka commuting area increased by 1.8 
times as a whole and among all the various means of transport the use of taxis 
-i 
Table 7. Changes in the Number of Passengers and Share of Transportation, By Types of Service 
(A) Tokyo Commuting Area 
.. .. 
Total Number of I National Private Subway Streetcar Bus 
Passengers· I Railways Railways 
(million) (index) Share (index) Share (index) Share (index) Share (index) Share (index) 
% % % % % 
1955 5,142.2 (100.0) 36.1 (100.0) 22.7 ( 100.0) 2.9 (100.0) 16.3 ( 100.0) 15.3 (100.0) 
1958 6,384.5 (124.2) 34.4 (IIB.O) 23.5 (128.3) 3.4 (144.7) 12.9 ( 99.1) 17.7 ( 143.3) 
1960 7,501.1 (145.9) 34.6 (139.5) 23.3 (149.8) 4.2 (208.6) 11.1 (100.0) 19.2 ( 182.3) 
1962 B,84B.6 (172.1) 32.7 (156.2) 23.B (IBO.6) 5.2 (305.9) 8.B ( 93.7) 20.B (234.0) 
1964 10,270.3 (199.7) 32.4 ( 178.9) 23.B (209.0) 6.5 (443.3) 6.9 ( 85.3) 21.4 (278.4) 
(B) Osaka Commuting Area 
1955 2,934.1 (100.0) 15.0 ( 100.0) 3B.4 (100.0) 5.1 ( 100.0) 23.3 (100.0) 12.8 (100.0) 
1958 3,474.1 (118.4) 16.1 (127.5) 33.7 ( 103.8) 5.8 (134.5) 22.6 (115.2) 15.0 (138.7) 
1960 3,922.0 (133.7) 16.5 (147.3) 32.1 (111.5) 5.9 (155.3) 20.7 (119.1) 17.4 (IBI.7) 
1962 4,706.1 (160.4) 17.1 (IB3.6) 31.5 (131.5) 6.2 (195.1) 17.2 (1IB.7) IB.9 (236.4) 














Source: Ministry of Transport, Annual Report of Urban Transportation (in Japanese), 1964; Statistical Handbook of Transportation EcoTWmy (in 
Japanese),1965. 
Note: 1. 'Share' means the percentage of the number of passengers for each transportation facility in proportion to the total number of all 
passengers carried. 
2. Streetcar includes trolley bus. 
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made the greatest increase, carrying approximately 3 times more people. Then the 
use of bus and subway comes next in the ranking order. The use of the streetcar 
showed a declining tendency after 1960, which clearly indicates that the demand 
also in this case was being shifted from the streetcar to taxi, bus and subway. 
As to transportation carrying passengers from the suburbs to the central city, 
its share shows a gradual decrease in 1955-60 and a gradual increase in 1960-65. 
This tendency is conspicuously characteristic of the private railways which hold the 
greatest share in the Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe area. It can be seen that all these findings 
are results arising from the increasing tendency of the rapid growth of population 
in the outskirts of big cities and the progress of new regional development undertaken 
by private railway enterprises. 
So far it has been shown, as far as transportation within cities is concerned, 
that the demand for the streetcar has shifted to that for motor car and subway, but 
in addition another important change in this connection is now taking place. In 
Table 8 are shown the peakyears of this transportation demand based on the data 
collected up to 1965 concerning the number. of passengers carried by streetcar 
and bus in the six largest cities. 
Table 8. Peakyears in which the Greatest Number of Passengers were carried by 
Streetcar and Bus 
Streetcar I Bus 
Commuter Commuter 
Ticket Others Total Ticket Others Total 
, 
I Holders I I I Holders I I .1 
Tokyo 1960 1960 1960 I 1963 I 1963 
Osaka 1961 1961 1961 1964 
! 1964 i 1964 
Nagoya 1957 1955 1955 1963 
Yokohama 1963 1961 1961 1964 
I 
1964 
Kyoto 1963 1961 1961 
I I 
1964 1964 
Kobe 1961 1961 1961 1964 1964 ! 
Note: Years on the list are preceding years in which the declining tendency appeared to become 
decisive. HenceJ they do not always coincide with the year of the greatest number of 
passengers. 
The streetcars in all these cities, with the exception of Nagoya, reached their 
peakyears in the period 1960-61, and thereafter they began to follow a decisively 
declining trend. Nagoya, being provided with favourable conditions for motor 
traffic by city planning, had already reached its peakyear in 1955, which is an 
eloquent illustration of one of the major influences upon urban transportation 
brought about by motorization. 
As against it, the demand for buses appears to be making a normal increase 
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to decline after reaching its peaky ear during the period 1963-64 as shown in Table 8. 
Although the number of commuters showed an increase even in 1965, with the excep-
tion of Osaka, judging from the facts that there was to some extent a lag between 
the number of commuters and other ordinary passengers in the case of streetcars 
and that the population of the central city began to decrease, it follows that the 
number of commuters will not increase further in the future. For these reasons it 
can safely be concluded that the motorization trend in the city has been launched 
into its second stage, involving automobile transportation such as taxis and private 
automobiles after passing through the initial stage of streetcars and buses. 
In the meanwhile, one of the most important factors which has produced the 
above-mentioned shifting in the transportation demand within large cities is that 
the state of traffic jams affecting surface transportation has become worse and worse 
(as shown Figure 2) as the number of private automobiles has increased and hence 
the speed of streetcars and buses was inevitably forced to be lowered'). 






















"-'~2.8 13.1 13.2 
"~.4 
12 3 ..... 12.1 9 . - .. __ 11. 11.8 
~-'::--'::..o.~ 12 11.9 11.9 11.9 - .. Streetcar 
11.7 
11 
1955 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 
Year 
Source: Transportation Bureau of Osaka City, Present Conditions of Osaka Municipal Transport 
Business, The Studies of Urban Problems (in japanese), Vol. 18, No. 11, Nov. 1966. 
Thus, the lowering of speed brought about a decrease in the passengers' 
demands urging them to make more use of taxis or private automobiles, and at the 
same time caused a decrease in the efficiency of the facilities owing to the decline 
of the total running mileage per car per day. This immediately means a decrease 
4) See Annual Report of Local Public Enterprises (in Japanese), No. 13, Table 61 about the speed of 
streetcars in each city, It may be added that it was in Osaka that the severest rate of lowering of 
the average speed was reported. 
, 
Table 9. Passengers and Capacity in Most Congested Areas in the Rush Hour Peak Period (I hour) 




People Indices People Indices 
A B 
1955 164,415 ( 100.0) 
, 
460,790 ( 100.0) 
• 
National Railways 1960 219,728 (133.6) 614,314 (133.3) 
~ (13 lines) 
" 
..:: 1964 I 277,730 (168.9) 729,800 (158.4) bJJ 
.§ 1955 86,172 (100.0) 168,41l ( 100.0) 
" Private Railways S 1960 140,3 I 9 (162.8) 295,998 (175.8) E (13 lines) 
0 1964 206,662 (239.8) I 414,143 (245.9) U 
0 .. 
>-. 1955 16,220 ( 100.0) 26,598 (100.0) ... 
0 Subways Eo< 1960 30,600 (188.7) 70,097 (263.5) (2 lines) 
1954 44,438 (273.8) 85,065 (319.8) 
-
1955 53,421 ( 100.0) 121,239 (100.0) 
oj 
National Railways 1960 62,794 (1l7.5) 146,204 (120.6) 
v (7 lines) 
~ 
...: 1964 79,528 ( 148.8) I 178,254 (147.0) OJ) 
.S 
I 
1955 75,399 ( 100.0) I 141,218 (100.0) ;; 
E Private Railways 1960 120,936 (160.4) 223,443 (158.2) S (10 lines) l 0 1964 161,028 (213.6) 334,268 (236.7) U 
oj I ... 1955 1l,520 ( 100.0) 25,825 ( 100.0) oj 
~ Subway 0 1960 20,160 (175.0) 45,323 (175.5) (1 line) 
1964 25,920 (225.0) 52,736 (204.2) 
----_ .. 
Source: Ministry of Transport, Annu.al Report of Urban Transportation (in Japanese), ]964, 1966. 
Note: In transportation capacity is included not only sitting seats but standing room (straps). 
I 
Ratio of Passengers to 
Capacity 
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in productivity and corresponding decrease in payability and it indicates that 
public transportation enterprises of streetcar and bus are being forced into a vicious 
circle, from which it is by no means easy for them to get away. Furthermore, 
because the population in the central city is decreasing as already pointed out, 
streetcars and buses within the city area are being forced into a hard-pressed 
situation. 
In sharp contrast, the demand for rapid transit such as national railways, private 
railways and subways is still increasing, and the state of hectic bustling particularly 
during rush hours remains aggravated without any sign of improvement, in spite of 
various projects to reinforce the transportation efficiency, the truth of which is 
clearly seen from Table 9. It is true, as is seen from the comparison of the indices 
for the number of passengers and the transportation capacity, that the transporta-
tion capacity was reinforced, but in fact it was only to an extent barely sufficient to 
cope with the increased number of passengers. Particularly, the congestion on 
the national railways has almost been driven to extremity and this tendency is so 
conspicuous in the Tokyo commuting area that five lines out of thirteen show as 
high a ratio as in 1964. 
It must be said that such circumstances have been caused by the absolute lack 
of investment for adequate commuter transportation facilities to cope with the recent 
cityward population movement and particularly the tendency of rapid expansion 
towards the outskirts of big cities, and it is also seen in Table 10 that the increase 
in investment for commuter transportation countermeasures, with the exception of 
subways, is by no means sufficient and that the national railways stand the lowest in 
the amount of investment for this purpose. Therefore, it leads us to the conclusion 
that, as far as investment for transportation capacity remains the same as before, 
there will be no hope in the future for any immediate solution of the prevailing rush 
hour difficulties. Accordingly, the key to this hard problem lies in the way of 
carrying out effective improvements in existing transportation facilities solely to 
meet this urgent demand. 
Table 10. Amount of Investment for Commuter Transportation Facilities 





1963 I 1964 
Amount (Indices)!Amount (IndiCes)IAmount (Indices)IAmount (Indices) 
National Railways 114 ( 100.0) I 107 ( 93.9) 95 ( 83.3) 117 (102.6) 
Private Railways 30B (100.0) 390 ( 126.6) 443 (143.8) 486 (157.8) 
Subways 290 ( 100.0) 343 (118.3) 475 (163.8) 569 (196.2) 
Total 712 (100.0) 840 (118.0) 1,013 ( 142.3) 1.172 (164.6) 
Note: 1. Government railway materials are used. 
2. The amount of investment for private railways represents the total sum put together for 
the 12 leading en terprises, which includes investment other than that for rush hour tran~­
portation. 
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Now, attention must lastly be given to the demand for automobile transporta-
tion, such as taxis and private autos. As shown in Table 7, the number of passengers 
carried by taxis has made rapid increases in both the Tokyo and Osaka commuting 
areas, showing conspicuous growth of late. 
As to the traffic volume of private automobiles, because of the unavailability 
of data concerning urban areas, "indices of the numbers of passengers carried by 
private automobiles in all Japan" were used to make a comparison with other types 
of transportation. As shown in Table II, the increase in transportation activities 
of private autos made the greatest growth. Again the trend to increase is becoming 
more and more conspicuous than ever, and this trend, coupled with the increasing 
demand for taxis, appears to be one of the most important reasons for the declining 
demand for streetcars and buses. 
Table II. Passenger Transportation Activity Indices, By Types of Service 
-~------.-----
Passengers Carried by Different Types 
Total ----- .--------~~. 
Transpor- I Private Railways I----~ 
tation Natinoal Private 
Activity Total Railways Commuter Buses Taxis Autos Ticket Others 
Holders 
1955 52.9 I 54.2 72.6 66.8 83.4 52.7 44.6 27.2 
1965 216.7 I 234.3 142.3 145.8 122.6 156.3 223.8 473.9 
Source: Statistical Section of Ministry of Transport, "Transportation Activity Indices", Nlonthly 
Research Bulletin of Transportation (in]apanese), Vol. 8, No.5, 1966. 
The possible future change in the demand for different types of transportation 
can be estimated by examining the elasticity of transportation activities with 
respect to National Economic Indices. 
In view of the above-mentioned tendency, let us see what changes are expected 
to take place in urban transportation in the furture. In this connection careful 
consideration should be given to the fact that the elasticities of the private railways' 
passengers other than commuters with respect to consumption expenditures are as 
small as 0.55 in contrast to the figure of private autos (3.76). This means that 
travelling for purposes other than regular commuting, such as shopping, recreation, 
etc., most of which is now being done by means of railway trains, is likely to be 
done by means of private automobiles as the level of individual income goes up. 
Needless to say, the tempo will be limited by the rate of increase in purchasing 
power over automobiles which will be created by growing income and the rate of 
progress of road construction, but it can safely be said that the shift from railways 
to private autos cannot be avoided sooner or later. 
What should be taken into consideration is whether or not private automobiles 
should come to be used as the main means of commuting, which is the case in some 
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Table 12. Elasticities of Transportation Activities with Respccllo National 
Economic Indices 
Indices for Total Transportation Activity 
























~--~~~ -~- -----~ ----- ----------'---------,- ----~-- -- ---~--
Source: Statistical Section of Ministry of Transport, "Transportation Activities in the Last 10 Years 
and Future Estimates", Monthly Research Bulletin of Transportation (in Japanese), Vol. 8, 
No 4, 1966. 
Note: Elasticities are calculated by estimating equations linear in logarithms. 
countries advanced in motorization these days. On this point it is necessary for us to 
pay careful attention to the fact that even in the U.S.A. recent reflections have the 
deep implication that it would by nO means be economical to substitute the private 
autos for the rail transit as the means of commuter transportation, because roads 
would always be inadequate however many might be constructed. Such reflections 
made the U.S.A. preceive the economic efficiency of mass transportation facilities 
anew, resulting in the 'Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964' and the construc-
tion of the 'San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit' system. In view of these ex-
periences, it naturally follows that the future picture of urban transportation in this 
country should be of twofold development, i.e. commuter transportation by meanS of 
mass transportation and travelling other than commuting by means of private autos. 
It is not desirable merely to depend On more road construction, even if a relatively 
long period is taken into account. Therefore, a definite policy for urban tranS-
portation should be laid down so that the fullest and most economic use of rapid 
transits as the means of mass transportation can be made in this country, where 
rapid transits have registered comparatively successful development. 
IV Changes in Cost and Supply of Urban Transportation 
Now, let us turn to what kind of changes in the conditions of cost and supply 
of transportation enterprises have occurred in order to cope with the changes in 
the demand for urban transportation. To do so, changes in the components of costs 
are analysed according to the type of transportation facility. Table 13 shows the 
costs per car-kilometer classified according to each factor of production, their per-
I 
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42.77 (21.3) 46.39 (20.1) 108.5 
61.54 (30.7) 85.26 (36.8) 138.5 








Source: About buses and streetcars (six largest cities) above figures are calculated from Ministry 
of Autonomy~ Annual Report of Local Public Enterprises (in Japanese), No. 13; and about 
private railways and subways from the Railway Supervising Bureau of the Ministry of 
Transport, Annual Statistical Report of Private Railways, 1960. 
Note: 1. 'Private railways' include the 14 biggest enterprises, and 'subways' include one in Tokyo 
and another in Osaka. 
2. 'Interest, etc.' includes the non-operating expenses that are administratively allotted 
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centage to total cost, their comparison between 1960 and 1965, and each item's 
relative share of the increase of total cost. 
I t can be seen, based on the figures for total cost per car-kilometer, that 
the costs of streetcar enterprises are extremely high, and it is strikingly noteworthy 
that their costs are rising of late and higher than the costs of subways now. As shown 
in Table 13, the principal reason lies in the rise of wage and it can easily be under-
stood that streetcars are the most uneconomic means of transport these days, because 
the shortage oflabor is becoming more and more serious and because further growth 
of labor productivity is impossible on account of the technological structure of street-
cars. As a result the labor costs for streetcar enterprises in the six largest cities, 
as shown in Table 14, exceeded business earnings in 1964, thus driving them into 
such an extremely bad financial state that business earnings were not sufficient 






Ratio of Total Expenditure and Wage Payment for Streetcar and Bus 
Enterprise (in the Six Largest Cities) to Business Earnings 
(%) 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 I 
------------- .. _-
--.. ----------_.- ~~-~-----------
Total Expenditure 121.4 125.4 139.0 152.3 171.3 
Wage Payment 85.8 86.5 94.4 107.3 121.4 
Total Expenditure 107.0 113.2 121.5 128.1 122.1 
Wage Payment 67.8 74.8 80.7 87.4 83.0 
Source: Ministry of Autonomy, Annual Report of Local Public Enterprises (in Japanese), No. 13. 
As to bus enterprises, they are in the same situation, if not worse than streetcar 
enterprises. The total expenditure for bnses per car-kilometer is about half that of 
streetcars, but a little less than private railways. Needless to say, the reason can 
also be sought in high labor costs. In particular labor costs for buses per car-kilo-
meter are above that of private railways and subways. Therefore, when their rela-
tively low transport capacity is taken into account, the estimated rising labor costs in 
the future will constitute a grave threat to the administration of bus enterprises as 
they already have in the case of streetcar enterprises. 
Streetcar enterprises have been obliged to run under deficit financing since 1958 
and the total expenditure in 1965 amounted to 171.3% of business earnings. Simi-
larly the total expenditure of bus enterprises, being driven into deficit financing since 
1961, turned out to show 122% of business earnings. Since such unbalanced finance 
between revenue and expenditure is caused partly by maintaining low fares and 
partly by the decreased number of passengers, it can be seen that public surface 
transportation enterprises these days have been driven into extremely grave financial 
difficulties. 
I t comes out, judging from the cost structures as shown in Table 13, that there 
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are, roughly speaking, the following two types of transportation enterprise which 
play an important role in urban transportation. One is the type which is character-
ised by the large percentage of labor costs, like buses and streetcars, whose labor 
costs occupy 60-70% of the total expenditure, and the other is the type which has 
a relatively small percentage of labor costs, like private (and national) railways 
and subways, whose capital costs, like depreciation and interest, amount to by far the 
greater sum. These two types are clearly distinguishable. Generally speaking, a 
transportation enterprise which constitutes a part of social overhead capital requires 
an enormous provision of fixed capital and for that reason it is naturally regarded 
as a capital-intensive industry. But the structure of its cost within its category is 
not always of uniform nature"). It follows, therefore, the factors leading to an 
increase in passenger fares vary depending upon the circumstances in each 
enterprise. 
Now, in the first type which is characterised by the high percentage of labor 
costs, the rate of increase in labor costs caused by the recent rise of wages is conspi-
cuous and correspondingly its share of the increase in total expenditure also stands 
as high as 70-80%. Therefore, it can be seen that in this type the wage increase 
has the greatest influence upon the increase of fares due to increased costs. In this 
connection what should be noted is the fact that the first type has a greater rate of 
increasing labor costs than the second type. This means that, since it can be con-
sidered that there is not much difference in the change in wage rates between the 
first type and other enterprises6 ), it is not so easy for the first type to substitute capital 
for labor and therefore, once wages rise, they are immediately reflected as an increase 
in costs. In addition another factor which is forcing greater increases in costs for 
the first type than for the second type can be attributed to the fact that the lowered 
running speed on account of traffic jams has a bad effect on the rate of utilization 
of the vehicles. 
In sharp contrast to this, the rate of increase in labor costs in the enterprise of the 
second type, which is characterised by a relatively low percentage of labor costs, is 
found to be far smaller in comparison with the first type, and correspondingly its 
share of the increase in total expenditure also stands somewhere around 30%. In 
the case of the second type capital costs, like depreciation and interest payment, are 
found to have a greater weight than labor costs, and so their share of the increase in 
total expenditure in the case of private railways stands at 53% and in the case of 
5) According to the Input-Output Table of Japan~ transportation industry is, generally speaking, 
lhc: irJdustry charal:teri:t;ed by a relatively high percentage of labor input. From this viewpoint 
the transportation industry stands in a specific position in social overhead capital. However, it 
is possible that transportation business may be divided into one kind characterised by a relatively 
high percentage aflabar input and the other by a low percentage. 
6) It may be true that public bus and streetcar enterprises are confronted with higher rates of wage 
increases because the workers engaged in public transportation facilities are relatively more ad 
vanced in age, but it may well be considered that the weight of this factor is comparatively small. 
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subways at 87.8%. In short, this means that to meet required reinforcement of 
transportation capacity to cope with the increasing demand, huge investments for 
facilities were made during this period 7) and moreover the greater part of funds for 
such investments was raised by loans. Nevertheless, as already pointed out, these 
expenses for capital will have to be further increased in view of the existing circum-
stances, under which further investment is still required on a far greater scale in 
order to reinforce transportation capacity, since the congestion during the rush 
hour is not only far from being relieved, but in some cases getting worse, due 
to the ever increasing demand for transportation. As far as the second type is 
concerned, therefore, the increase in capital costs is found to be the greatest factors 
in bringing forth pressure to raise passenger fares, which in turn will be followed by 
increases in labor costs. Consequently what course of change the respective weight 
of these two factors will take in the future will be determined by the extent to which 
labor is to be replaced by capital. 
In this connection it is noticeable that among capital costs the rate of increase 
in interest is very high, so that its relative weight also runs very high. Particularly 
in the case of subways, its share of increase in cost even runs as high as 76.2%, 
showing how heavy an obligation it is for subway enterprises to pay interest. Table 
15 clarifies this situation in detail. 
Not merely the payment of interest but also the redemption of enterprise loans 
Table 15. Financial Condition of Subway Enterprises, Their Earnings, 
Redemption and Interest Payment (Unit: 1 million) 
I 1960 I 1961 I 1962 I 1963 I 1964 I 
4,299.6 I I 
I 
Earning of Fares A 3,440.4 4,938.1 6,140.1 i 7,680.2 I Expenditure for ! I 
Construction and B 11,595.7 14,266. I 
I 
17,529.2 I I 21,354.1 ! 28,397.5 
Improvements i 
Redemption for C 604.3 470.1 I 1,068.9 I 1,884.3 Enterprise Loan , I 
Converted Loan D i 326.0 - 302.0 820.8 
C-D=E 278.3 470.1 766.9 1,063.5 
Interest for F 967.7 1,619.5 2,132.4 3,065.4 En terprise Loan 
E+F=G 1,245.9 2,089.6 2,899.3 4,128.9 
E/Ax 100 8.1 10.9 15.5
1 
17.3 
G/Ax 100 36.2 48.6 58.7 67.2 
Source: Annual Report of Local Public Enteprises (in Japanese), No. 13. 



















7) The fiscal years 1961-63 happen to be the period during which thC' first transportation capacity 
rcinrorcem~nt project was put into practice. 
Table Hi. Trend in the Profits of Leading Private Railway Enterprises (Division of Railway Business) 
.. 
I , Non-operating -
. -~ --,-
Ratio of Non-ope- Ratio of I Business Business Business Rate of Expenditure Estimated Net Profit Ratio of I 
Earnings Expenses Profits Profit rating '-- Net Profit to Interest to In terest tOl Earnings (Interest) Earnings Earnings I Earnings 
i Oct. I 
J Mar. I 




























I 38,669 34,307 I 
I 42,250 37,979 
I 










4,362 11.3%1 2,101 
I , i 
4,271 10.1 i 2,209 
i 
6,305 13.7 2,314 
I 
! I 
I 8,234 15.9 2,775 
I 
8,732 16.5 2,872 








I 4,516 4,237 1,947 I 5.3% 11.0% 97.2% 
: 
4,961 4,760 1,947 I 3.6 11.3 111.4 
i 
I 
! 5,496 5,210 3,123 6.8 11.3 82.6 : 
i I 
, 




i 6,886 6,658 4,718 8.9 12.6 76.2 
I 
: 
7,896 7,632 I 4,203 
i 
7.4 13.4 89.4 , 
I 
I 
8,229 7,735 I 3,181 I 5.7 13.8 101.1 : I , 
Source: The Investigation Section of the Sumitomo Trust and Company, "Problems of Private Railway Enterprises"~ Report (in JapaneseL No. 750.-
Note: l. Non-operating accounting is based on the proportional distribution of business earnings. 
2. Based on Reports on Valuable Securities of the 14 leading private railway enterprises. 
URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 75 
are becoming heavy obligations for the finance of subway enterprises and the relative 
weight of these two items against the earning of passenger fares is increasing from 
year to year, amounting to as much as approximately 80% of it in 1965. As a result, 
they are being driven into worse and worse financial circumstances, in which they 
have to get new loans only to pay back their previous loans. Particularly in 1965 
they were as a matter of fact so hard pressed that they had to raise funds on their 
converted loans totalling as much as ¥ 5,000,000,000 and only by so doing could 
they barely manage to keep the amount of redemption of principal and interest 
payment within 80% of the earning of passenger fares. 
Similarly, in the case of private railway enterprises the relative weight of expen-
diture for interest payments to the increase in total expenditure stands the highest 
among others, but the ratio of interest payments to total expenditure is not so much as 
in the case of subways. In order to clarify this point in detail reference is to be made 
to Table 16, which shows the recent trend of profitability in the division of railway 
business of the 14 leading private railway enterprises. To start with, their business 
earnings with the exception of the semiannual period ending in March 1965, has 
shown a comparatively normal growth solely because of the raised passenger fares 
put into effect since November 1962. 
However, the rates of business profit repeat such a curve as keeps rising during 
the period of one and half years or so immediately after the raise in passenger fares 
and then begins to decline until the original profit rate is restored by the time of the 
next raise in passenger fares. In other words this means that the profitability of 
private railway enterprises is governed, fundame"ntally speaking, by the raise in 
passenger fares. Of course the cause, needless to say, lies in the increase in all cate-
gories of expenditure due to the rising prices of commodities, but as shown in Table 
13, it should be noted that the increase in the weight of depreciation and interest 
payments has a particularly important meaning. In connection with the expen-
diture for interest payments it comes to light that, although the ratio of interest pay-
ments to the business earnings is a little over 10%, it is gradually and steadily in-
creasing every year. Furthermore what is particularly characteristic is the fact that 
expenditure for interest payments almost counterbalances railway business profits, 
and that it actually exceeded business profits in the period immediately prior to the 
year when the raise in passenger fares was put into effect. 
I t can be concluded, therefore, that the recent tendency indicates that the net 
profit of railway business, exclusive of non-operating revenues, remained in surplus 
during the period immediately after the raise in passenger fares but gradually 
declined to zero. For this reason it follows that sub-business occupies a very 
important position in the administration of private railway enterprises. 
Now, then, let us see what significance sub-business may have in the man-
agement of private railway enterprises. Needless to say, the problem of sub-business 
is one of the most important points constituting the difference in the content of ad-
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ministration between private and public enterprises. By clarifying to what extent 
sub-business is supplementary to main business it becomes possible to grasp how the 
so-called external economy brought about on account of urbanization is enjoyed by 
private enterprises and how the external economy which they bring about is inter-
nalized to their advantage. Now, sub-business may be classified into inside sub-
business and outside sub-business (the latter is administrated through investments 
and loans to affiliated companies). Table 17 shows some data with respect to inside 
sub-business. 
The weight of railway business to total business earnings used to stand at ap-
Table 17. Business Earnings and Business Profits according to Different Divisions 
of Business of Leading Private Railway Enterprises (Unit: 'I' I million) 
(I) Component Percentage of Business Earnings 







-Mar. 1965 B 
BjA 
Main I Sub-Business I 
Business ! ___ ___,--,~:-;-___,---___,----
Railways 1 Bus Real lathers I Subtotal I Estate I 
Total 
55.8%1 20.0% 11.2%1 13.0%11 
55.5 21.0 Il.l 12.4 I 
44.2% ¥ 69,266 100.0%, 
44.5 76,138 100 
55.0 19.3 12.3 13.5 I 45.0 83,724 100 
56.4 19.7 11.3 12.6 43.6 92,150 100 
53.7 16.9 13.1 16.3 46.3 98,386 100 
53.3 I 17.4 15.7 13.6 46.7 107,081 100 
4~::~L_~~;8 __ 1~:~2 _~!~~ ___ 5~::7_1_113, 131864100 
(2) Component Percentage of Business Profits 
Oct. 1961 


























































Source: The aforementioned data prepared by the Investigation Section of the Sumiwmo Trust 
and Company. 
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proximately 55%, but it kept declining, passing through the peak term which ended 
in September 1963 when the raise in passenger fares were in full play, and it declined 
as low as less than 50% during the semiannual term ending in March 1965. This 
tendency is more conspicuous with respect to their business profits, indicating a 
decrease from 60% to 44% during the same period. In contrast to the trend of their 
main business, the decrease in the weight of bus business and the rapid increase in 
the weight of real estate business were conspicuous. 
Although bus business occupied an important position for private railway 
enterprises during the period prior to 1961-62 when surface traffic began to become 
congested, their payability since then began to be acutely aggravated and the bus 
business profits of most of these enterprises turned out to be in deficit. As a result 
their business profit for the semiannual term ending in March 1965 was no less than 
7% of that for the term ending in March 1962. 
On the other hand the division of real estate business showed rapid growth in 
the weight of business, gaining 2.6 times more business earnings and 3 times more 
business profits during these three years. Particularly their business profit was 
way above that of main railway business during the semiannual term ending in 
March 1965, gaining over 50% of all business profits. Needless to say, this was 
made possible by the increased population in the urban outskirts and the unexpected 
rise in land prices, and it can safely be concluded from this aspect that private rail-
way enterprises are taking full advantage of the external economies brought forth 
by the urbanization movement and at the same time they are successfully internaliz-
ing the external economies which their railway business brings forth by operating 
real estate business as sub-business under the management of their main business. 
Furthermore, real estate business serves the function of a safetyvalve through which 
the necessary profits can be adjusted as their administrative policy requires. In 
other words, there is a tendency to narrow down the profit of real estate business 
when railway business is making a large profit, and to swell out the profit of the 
real estate division when main business is in depression. From this viewpoint it 
can be said that real estate business holds the most important position among the 
essential divisions of diversified management if the existing railway enterprises are 
to survive as private concerns. 
Among "others" categories of diversified management, are included recreation 
centers, department stores, hotels, etc. Although their business earnings show a gra-
dual increase, business profits show a rapid decline with the peak of the semiannual 
term ending in March 1964, the fact of which is suggestive of the relative decline in 
their significance. 
Making a long story short, we can reach the conclusion that one of the most 
important categories of diversified administration of sub-business is none other than 
real estate and that growing importance will be attached to this particular business, 
in which they can enjoy to the fullest extent the external economies brought forth 
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as a result of the recent urbanization movement, as long as it remains continuous. 
Next consideration will be given to outside sub-business. As is well known, 
the number of affiliated companies of 14 leading private railway companies amounts 
to the enormous figures of as many as 602 companies, which they listed on valuable 
securities list. A leading company has as many as 43 affiliated companies on the 
average and a maximum of as many as 93. The total amount of loans to and 
investment in their affiliated companies amounts to approximately 1.2 times of their 
paidup capital (V97,100,000,000) as of the semiannual term ending in March 
1965. These facts show that they form a gigantic group of enterprises. 
Now, let us turn to Table 18 to see the result of investment in and loans to affili-
ated companies in the light of dividends and interest received. In the first place 
the rate of return on their investment fluctuates above and below 4% and the rate 
of return on their loans is 7.2% on the average, resulting in 6.0% in total figures. 
On the other hand, because the average rate of interest payment for long and short 
term loans and debentures is approximately 8.6%, the balance is on the minus side, 
showing that the expected profit has not been obtained, thus making little con-
tribution to the overall profit. 
Table 18. Investment in and Loans to Affiliated Companies (Unit: ¥) 
i Investment and Loans Revenues and Rate of Return 
St:k I 
I DiVi~endI2D/A !Interest I 2E/B Loan I Total 
I 
Recelved ,ReceIVed I 
B C D , %! E I % 
Oct. 1961 69,351 I 
I I 
~Mar. 1962 25,966 43,385 488 (3.7) , 1,664 i (7.7) ! 
~Sep. 1962 28,648 48,515 77,163 694 (4.8) 1,618 (6.7) 
~Mar. 1963 31,254 53,828 85,082 566 (3.6) 1,876 (7.0) 
~Sep. 1963 34,969 58,796 93,765 810 (4.6) 2,012 (6.8) 
~Mar. 1964 39,540 64,937 104,477 718 (3.6) 2,249 (6.9) 
~Sep. 1964 43,096 68,958 112,054 898 (4.2) 2,566 (7.4) 
~Mar. 1965 45,764 68,560 114,324 679 (3.0) 2,920 (8.5) 
Average (3.9) (7.2) 
.. _._------------
----,-, 
Source: Prepared from the aforementioned data, Sumitomo Trust and Company. 
Note: Estimated from 'Valuable Securities Report' of 13 companies. 










Nevertheless, the figures quoted above are strictly concerned with averages and 
among them many companies with varied backgrounds are naturally included, such 
as those that were affiliated because of their financial difficulties, those that are not 
at the stage of making a profit because of their recent start in business, those that 
are playing an important role in spite of low payability, as feeders for main business, 
etc. Therefore, it is not justifiable to underevaluate the position of outside sub-
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sis should be made on the basis of consolidated balance sheets. On the contrary, 
it can be considered, in view of the prevailing indications of the stagnant financial 
state of main railway business, that more and more significance will be attached to 
further investment in and loans to affiliated concerns on an increasing scale as 
both necessary and preliminary provisions for the future development of tertiary 
industry, particularly service industry'). 
V Problems of Passenger Fares and Urban Transport Policy 
It has become clear from the foregoing discussions that there exists a great dif-
ference in conditions which exert considerable influence upon demand and upon 
supply, depending on the different means of urban transportation. It is impossible, 
therefore, to discuss the urban transportation policy without giving due considera-
tion to the particular difference in the above-mentioned conditions, and it is 
necessary before doing so to give some consideration to several theoretical issues 
concerning such problems. 
The question which must be taken up in the first place is "To what extent do 
passenger fares perform a function of price, i.e. adjustment of demand and supply, 
or efficient allocation of economic resources?". Of course there is no doubt that 
passenger fares as prices, discharge a function of adjusting demand and supply and 
allocating economic resources to some extent, but the actual prices, being under strict 
government control') fixed without any change for a considerable period of time, 
are deprived of the performance of being modified in accordance with changes in the 
conditions of demand and supply. This price-fixing policy has been adopted mainly 
for political reasons in the economic circumstances of the rises in prices of com-
modities caused by a rapidly growing economy. So the prices of transport services 
have been simply left way below the supposed-to-be current level. This tendency 
is particularly conspicuous in the case of public transportation and has the effect of 
hindering the adequate functioning of prices in the form of fares. 
This naturally leads to the opinion, in view of these circumstances, that the ori-
ginal function of prices should by all means be restored by correcting inadequately 
fixed prices' 0). On the contrary, there is another opinion holding that the solution 
of urban transportation problem has no room for any pricing policy and that urban 
B) Great number of the companies affiliated with private railway enterprises belongs to service 
industry. 
9) It requires a decision of the Diet to revise the passenger fares of the government railways and a 
decision of the ·city assembly to revise those of the various means of public transportation, and it 
requires government approval to revise those of private railways. In any case, raise in fares is 
not an easy task and is extremely inflexible. 
10) See Ryohei KakumotoJ Fundamental Policy oj Urban TransjJortation (in Japanese), 1961; and 
Urban Transportation (in Japanese), 1963. 
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development policy is of decisive importance, and consequently that keeping down 
prices of transport services is unavoidable in order to prevent rises in prices of 
commodities. But even if it is impossible to find a fundamental solution solely by 
raising passenger fares, it is also obvious that numerous other bad influences have 
arisen brought about by keeping the fares low. Taking public transportation for an 
example, because of low fares that were maintained for a long period of time without 
even covering costs, deficits came to amount to an enormous sum and yet they had 
no other way to deal with them than to depend on loans. Under these circum-
stances they are driven into a worse and worse vicious circle and can barely find 
a way just to pay the interest. In this way most public transport enterprises 
these days are forced into a state of financial failure. On the other hand, it is true 
that the low rates of passenger fares tend to have the effect of aggravating the state 
of the existing excessive demand as they lessen resistance to the cityward movement 
of population. Moreover, even if some appropriate urban development policy is 
put into practice, this unbalanced level of passenger fares will after all have the effect 
of reducing the merits of the policy. Consequently, it follows that the rates of 
passenger fares should be so adjusted, concurrently with the enforcement of an 
appropriate urban development policy, that they could bring about the efficient 
allocation of economic resources. In addition, it is practically confirmed by input-
output analysis of price changes
"
) that the influence of increase in prices of transport 
services upon commodity prices is not so marked as commonly imagined, excepting 
its psychological effect. Therefore, it is not necessarily wise to carry out a price 
policy by fixing some prices at a low level, but what is rather desirable is to give 
passenger fares the right place in the existing scale of commodity prices. On this 
subject, it may be added that the most important issues of price policy is a cutting-
down of monopolistic prices, reduction of distribution costs by modernization of 
physical distribution, stabilization of agricultural product prices, etc. 
While considering things in this way, the next problem to be taken up is "What 
kind of criterion should be adopted for a passenger fare policy?". The actual rule 
of pricing adopted by most enterprises is based on the "principle of average cost 
pricing" in a broad sense under the system of self-supporting accounting, laying 
aside the question whether it is being carried out authentically or not. Needless 
to say, this principle is so conceived as to make it possible for an enterprise above 
all other things to redeem the capital invested without being subsidized. At the 
same time this principle is also designed to acquire further capital by guarantee-
mg a fair rate of return, thereby to enforce rational administration of its own 
11) See, Statistical Section of Ministry of Transport, "Input-Output Analysis of the Transport 
Sector", Monthly Research Bulletin of Transportation (in Japanese), Vol. 7, No.1, 1965. As to 
questions concerning these analyses, see Hiroyuki Yamada, "Input-Output Model about 
the Effects on Prices of Freight Rates Change", Monthly Research Bulletin of Transportation (in 
Japanese), Vol 8, No.4, 1966. 
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enterprise. The question put forth in this connection, however, is the point that 
this principle is conceived to determine the prices without giving due con-
sideration to the aspect of the optimal allocation of economic resources. 
In contrast to this principle there is what is called the "principle of marginal 
cost pricing" which is desirable from the aspect of the optimal allocation of econ-
omic resources. While the "principle of average cost pricing" takes the redemption 
of invested capital as the standard of pricing from the standpoint of individual enter-
prises, the "principle of marginal cost pricing" takes the most efficient allocation 
of resources as the standard of price determination from the aspect of the maximum 
welfare of the whole society. Consequently, no questions arise as far as the two 
standards are in agreement. But when they are not, the latter should receive pri-
ority from the standpoint of society as a whole. Nevertheless, when it comes to the 
actual application of this marginal principle, there are not a few problems to be 
pointed out, and so only some of them of particular importance will be taken up next. 
Firstly, if the price is to be determined in accordance with the principle of mar-
ginal cost pricing, it does not always follow that enterprises are self-supporting, and 
under such circumstance the loss has to be supplemented by taxes, the fact of which 
gives rise to redistribution of incomes. 
Secondly, this principle is not entirely free from the criticism that there is very 
little possibility of successfully applying it to existing economic activities which are 
making dynamic progress, because it is only to economic activities of a static nature 
that its main point is applicable. 
Thirdly, what gives rise to another question is that in the real economy where 
market imperfection exists, monopolistic enterprises exercise price control in the 
field of its own business to its exclusive advantage and that the marginal con-
dition is no longer fulfilled in these sectors. Now, the most sophisticated point 
of this argument against marginal cost pricing is the theory of "Second Best" which 
urges us to seek the best possible conditions under a particular circumstance 
where such a marginal condition is lacking in some part of the economic system, 
and it holds that applying this principle of marginal cost pricing in any public sector 
with market imperfection might hinder the second best way of resource allocation. 
Consequently, it follows that marginal cost pricing is in need of modification under 
such circumstances I2 ). 
As far as these questions are involved in the principle of marginal cost pricing, 
we may safely say that its elaborate application is not always practicable, but we 
can insist that it is preferable, in view of the aspect of efficient allocation of 
resources and effective utilization which the marginal principle originally intended 
to achieve, to determine the price in accordance with particular conditions in 
12) cr. R.G. Lipsey and R.K. Lancaster, "The General Theory of Second Best"~ Review 0/ Economic 
Studies, No. 63, 1956. 
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individual enterprises without sticking to the principle of self-supporting account-
ing, and this last point after all is one of the most significant implications of the 
"principle of marginal cost pricing". 
In this connection it should be pointed out that there is another important 
factor which is detrimental to the effectiveness of the price mechanism. That is to 
say, there is an effect which may be termed external economy or diseconomy. For 
instance, it is well known that the increased price of land in the area of a newly con-
structed railway or road is one of the most typical examples of external economy. 
On the other hand such loss that is caused by the decreased speed of streetcars 
due to the increased number of motor vehicles is none other than one kind of external 
diseconomy. In the case of the former example, if the railway enterprise already 
owned the land, whose price went up and got the profit from it, such an enterprise 
could make good use of such external economy to their own advantage. In fact 
many private railway enterprises carryon real estate business of their own as sub-
business as already described, to internalize such external economy. 
On the contrary, public streetcar enterprises are not allowed to engage in any 
sub-business and suffer a great loss from the said external diseconomy caused in 
proportion to the increased number of motor vehicles, without being favoured with 
an opportunity to make use of the profit which might come from such external 
economy. Therefore, it leads to the conclusion that an urban transportation policy 
should be formulated with due consideration of these points. 
Now, with these theoretical issues in mind we shall proceed to see what the pas-
senger fare policy for urban transportation and how urban transportation policy 
should be determined. To do so it is desirable to classify existing urban transpor-
tation facilities into the following three types, because of different conditions III 
demand and supply: 
(a) First type .......... Public surface transportation facilities 
(b) Second type ........ Rapid transits (subways, private railways and go-
vernment railways) 
(c) Third type ......... Individual means of transportation (automobiles; 
taxis and privately owned cars) 
The first type is characterised by the distinctive features that demand shows a 
declining or stagnant tendency on the one hand and the weight of labor costs to 
total expenditure is rather great on the other, that it is not so easy to substitute 
capital for labor and lastly that the pressure of increased wages has a direct influence. 
Consequently, there is no necessity for further investment in public transportation 
facilities of this type, since the demand for them shows a downward trend and it 
is desirable that the passenger fares should be determined with due consideration 
for making efficient use of the existing tracks. 
However, as to streetcars we may say that there is no longer a good reason for 
insisting on their continued operation, as far as there is a possibility of substitution 
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by bus or subway, because their running costs are higher these days than those of 
buses or su bwa ys. 
In the case of rapid transits belonging to the second type, demand exhibits a 
pronounced increase and investment for facilities to reinforce their transportation 
capacity is being made in increasing amounts. For these reasons the composition of 
their total costs shows a greater weight of expenses for capital, such as depreciation 
and payment of interest, which at the same time constitutes the main factors for their 
higher cost. As previously seen, the reason why the demand is growing is because 
of the increased number of commuters; the number of ordinary passengers being 
rather stagnant and the ratio of commuters to total passengers showing an ever-
increasing tendency. It appears that this tendency will grow more and more prono-
unced as the demand is shifted to the use of automobiles in the future. For these 
reasons it can be assumed that commuter transportation will become the principal 
function of urban rapid transits. Therefore, the existing rates of passenger fares 
fixed on the basis of cost of transporting ordinary passengers will have to be gradually 
revised so as to be based on that of commuters. 
If all expenses arising out of the enormous amount of additionally invested 
capital were to be collected from the fares of commuter under such circumstances, 
the fares would become extremely expensive. However, it is by no means adequate 
to charge all the expenses involved in the construction of new facilities to the users 
of that particular means of transportation (=direct beneficiaries). The reason is 
that there are also indirect beneficiaries who share the benefits of external economy 
brought forth by additional investment. There is a good reason to say that those 
beneficiaries, like land owners in areas newly developed by railway construction, 
should share some of the construction expenses. In the case of private enterprises 
all such 'development benefits' are by themselves enjoyed by managing to carry out 
real estate business as already discussed-a mechanism to internalize such external 
economy is built in their administration. On the contrary, in the case of public 
enterprises they are confronted with very unfavourable circumstances because of 
the lack of such a mechanism. Consequently it can reasonably be considered that 
new construction expenses should be shared in the way of collecting an additional 
tax for real estate. 
Individual means of transportation classified as the third type are making the 
most striking developments these days and it is expected that, the more handsome the 
income earned is, the greater the demand for them will be. However, although they 
are means of transportation that have the highest costs, it cannot always be said that 
individual means of transportation, generally speaking, have such high costs if the 
speed and value of time which can be saved by door-to-door transportation are 
taken into consideration. Speaking of privately owned cars, when it is taken into 
consideration that driving one's own car in itself gives the driver pleasurable satis-
faction, the simple comparison of the cost with that of other means of transportation 
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is rather meaningless. Moreover, the purchase and utilization of private cars are 
completely left to the free choice of the consumer and it is not too much to say that 
what the government is concerned with is only the scale of investment for roads. 
Therefore, the problem is "To what extent should the construction, improvement 
and maintenance of roads be carried out?", but it can safely be said in this connec-
tion, as mentioned before, that it is not desirable to make plans so that private cars 
can be utilized for the purpose of commuting as practised in the U.S.A. As we have 
learned from American experience, it would require an inconceivably enormous 
amount of funds, and, what is worse, traffic congestion would still remain, if it were 
not actually aggravated- the spiral of cars and roads. Therefore, I can hardly 
avoid the conclusion that to utilize private cars for the purpose of commuting is 
extermely uneconomical from the aspect of the national economy, that high speed 
mass transportation is most suitable for the purpose which is characterized by a 
voluminous stream of transportation for a limited duration of time, and that it 
will be a natural course of events for trips other than for commuting purposes to 
be made more and more frequently by private cars in the future. Therefore, 
adequate road construction should be duly expedited to cope with the expected 
future demand. 
